CASE DIGEST: Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-33146 (77 SCRA 264)

Concept: Doctrine of Prior Resort

Facts:

·      The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs in their exhaustive and scholarly petition for certiorari, filed on February 11, 1971, was on the jurisdictional issue. It sought to nullify and set aside order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro dated January 4, 1971, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, restraining petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary to law and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of the Tariff and Customs Code.

·      In a detailed and specific fashion, petitioners pointed out how violative was the assumption of jurisdiction by respondent Judge over an incident of a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding which, as held in a number of decisions, was a matter falling within the exclusive competence of the customs authorities. The persuasive character of the petition is thus evident, resulting in this Court issuing on February 15, 1971 a resolution requiring respondents to file an answer and at the same time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by petitioners to prevent the challenged order of respondent Judge from being implemented. Instead of preparing an answer, they just submitted a manifestation stating that "after an intensive and serious study of the merit of the case, the respondents have decided to abandon its interest in the case.

Issue: W/ON Custom has Jurisdiction

Held: Yes. risdiction of the customs authorities is exclusive was made clear in Pacis v. Averia, decided in 1966. This Court, speaking through Justice J. P. Bengzon, realistically observed: "This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings." The court "should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs."

The controlling principle was set forth anew in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, decided in 1971. Thus: "The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter.

Source and Full text case: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/may1977/gr_33146_1977.html

CASE DIGEST: Leonardo Paat vs CA G.R. no. 111107 (266 SCRA 167)

Concept:   Doctrine of Prior Resort

Facts:

·      May19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver of the truck was not able to produce the required documents for the forest products.

·      Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit an explanation. Owner was not able to sumbit an explanation and the order of the CENRO was enforced.

·      The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While pending, the owner filed a suit for replevin against the Layugan. Layugan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Trial court ruled in favor of the owner. CA sustained Trial Court’s decision

Issue: W/ON the trial court has jurisdiction?

Held. No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.

 Source and Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jan1997/111107.htm

CASE DIGEST: Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA G.R. No. 88550 (184 SCRA 462) Case Digest

Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Facts:

·       Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of  Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks.

·       IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC.

·       IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the operation be granted back.

·       Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed

·       Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.

·       RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.

·       CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" 

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

Original source and full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/apr1990/gr_88550_1990.html

CASE DIGEST: EMELITA NICARIO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 125340. September 17, 1998 (Case Digest)

Concept: It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers favor.

Facts:

Emelita Nicario, was employed with respondent company Mancao Supermarket, 

on June 6, 1986 as a salesgirl and was later on promoted as sales supervisor. However, private respondent terminated her services on February 7, 1989. A complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for backwages, wage differential, service incentive leave pay, overtime pay, 13^th month pay and unpaid wages was filed by petitioner before the National Labor Relations Commission, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch X in Butuan City.

On July 25, 1989, Labor Arbiter Amado M. Solamo dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.

NLRC set aside the labor arbiters decision for lack of due process. It ruled that since petitioner assailed her supposed signatures appearing on the payrolls presented by the company as a forgery, the labor arbiter should not have merely depended on the xerox copies of the payrolls, as submitted in evidence by the private respondent but ordered a formal hearing on the issue. Thus, the Commission ordered the case remanded to the arbitration branch for appropriate proceedings

Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Not satisfied with the decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC, and in a resolution dated August 16, 1995,^[4] the Commission affirmed in toto Labor Arbiter Macaraig-Guillens decision. Private respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration. In a resolution dated December 21, 1995, public respondent NLRC modified its earlier resolution by deleting the award for overtime pay and ruling that private respondent Antonio Mancao is not jointly and severally liable with Mancao Supermarket to pay petitioner the monetary award adjudged.

Petitioner now comes before this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent NLRC in ruling that (a) she is not entitled to overtime pay and (b) private respondent, Antonio Mancao cannot be held jointly and severally liable with respondent supermarket as to the monetary award.

Issue: W/ON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: Yes. This Court, in previously evaluating the evidentiary value of daily time records, especially those which show uniform entries with regard to the hours of work rendered by an employee, has ruled that such unvarying recording of a daily time record is improbable and contrary to human experience. It is impossible for an employee to arrive at the workplace and leave at exactly the same time, day in day out. The uniformity and regularity of the entries are badges of untruthfulness and as such indices of dubiety. The observations made by the Solicitor General regarding the unreliability of the daily time records would therefore seem more convincing. On the other hand, respondent company failed to present substantial evidence, other than the disputed DTRs, to prove that petitioner indeed worked for only eight hours a day. It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers favor.

Source and Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/sep1998/125340.htm