CASE DIGEST: DOLE Phils., petitioners Vs Pawis ng Makabayang Obrero, respondents G.R. No. 146650 January 13, 2003

DOLE Phils., petitioners  Vs Pawis ng Makabayang Obrero, respondents                                                    

G.R. No. 146650    January 13, 2003

Doctrine: The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and unambiguous. The terms are explicit and the language of the CBA is not susceptible to any other interpretation. Hence, the literal meaning of free meals after three (3) hours of overtime work shall prevail, which is simply that an employee shall be entitled to a free meal if he has rendered exactly, or no less than, three hours of overtime work, not after more than or in excess of three hours overtime work.

The exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. It is subject to the limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement or the general principles of fair play and justice. This situation constitutes one of the limitations. The CBA is the norm of conduct between petitioner and private respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.

Facts:

February 22, 1996, a new five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement for the period starting February 1996 up to February 2001, was executed by petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc., and private respondent Pawis Ng Makabayang Obrero-NFL (PAMAO-NFL). Among the provisions of the new CBA is the disputed section on meal allowance under Section 3 of Article XVIII on Bonuses and Allowances. Some departments of Dole reverted to the previous practice of granting free meals after exactly three hours of actual overtime work. However, other departments continued the practice of granting free meals only after more than three hours of overtime work. Thus, private respondent filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board alleging that petitioner Dole refused to comply with the provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA because it granted free meals only to those who rendered overtime work for more than three hours and not to those who rendered exactly three hours overtime work.

The parties agreed to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. Thereafter, the voluntary arbitrator, deciding in favor of the respondent, issued an order directing petitioner Dole to extend the free meal benefit to those employees who actually did overtime work even for exactly three hours only.

Petitioner Dole asserts that the phrase after three hours of actual overtime work should be interpreted to mean after more than three hours of actual overtime work. On the other hand, private respondent union and the voluntary arbitrator see it as meaning after exactly three hours of actual overtime work.

Petitioner asserts that the phrase after three (3) hours of actual overtime work does not mean after exactly three hours of actual overtime work; it means after more than three hours of actual overtime work. Petitioner insists that this has been the interpretation and practice of Dole for the past thirteen years. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that after three (3) hours of actual overtime work simply means after rendering exactly, or no less than, three hours of actual overtime work.

Issue: W/ON The omission of the phrase more than between after and three hours in the present CBA spells a big difference.

Held: No. No amount of legal semantics can convince the Court that after more than means the same as after. The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and unambiguous. The terms are explicit and the language of the CBA is not susceptible to any other interpretation. Hence, the literal meaning of free meals after three (3) hours of overtime work shall prevail, which is simply that an employee shall be entitled to a free meal if he has rendered exactly, or no less than, three hours of overtime work, not after more than or in excess of three hours overtime work.

Source and Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/146650.htm

CASE DIGEST: ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW, petitioners vs. NLRC, respondents G.R. No. 162053 March 7, 2007

Doctrine: Police Power

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.

Facts:

Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) on October 13, 1984. She is a graduate of Associate in Radiologic Technology from The Family Clinic Incorporated School of Radiologic Technology. On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the "Radiologic Technology Act of 1992." Said law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology. On September 12, 1995, the Assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of private respondent SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the requirement of Republic Act No. 7431 by December 31, 1995; otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available. The Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a final notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos requiring the latter to comply with Republic Act. No. 7431 by taking and passing the forthcoming examination scheduled in June 1997; otherwise, private respondent SLMC may be compelled to retire her from employment should there be no other position available where she may be absorbed. On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos informing the latter that the management of private respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay. Private respondent SLMC issued a "Notice of Separation from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective December 30, 1998 in view of the latter's refusal to accept private respondent SLMC's offer for early retirement. On January 6, 1999, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC again issued a "Notice of Separation from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective February 5, 1999 after the latter failed to present/ submit her appeal for rechecking to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of the recent board examination which she took and failed. On January 6, 1999, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC again issued a "Notice of Separation from the Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective February 5, 1999 after the latter failed to present/ submit her appeal for rechecking to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of the recent board examination which she took and failed.

NLRC rendered a decision in favor of Petitioner

Issue: Whether the CA overlooked certain material facts and circumstances on petitioners' legal claim in relation to the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Held: No, While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers

Source and Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/march2007/162053.htm