Manila Electric Company vs. The City of Assessor and City Treasurer of Lucena City, GR No. 166102 dated August 5, 2015 (Protest)

 

Facts:

·         MERALCO is a private corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws to operate as a public utility engaged in electric distribution.

·         On February 20, 1989, MERALCO received from the City Assessor of Lucena a copy of Tax Declaration No. 019-6500 covering the following electric facilities, classified as capital investment, of the company: (a) transformer and electric post; (b) transmission line; (c) insulator; and (d) electric meter, located in Quezon Ave. Ext., Brgy. Gulang-Gulang, Lucena City. Under Tax Declaration No. 019-6500, these electric facilities had a market value of P81,811,000.00 and an assessed value of P65,448,800.00, and were subjected to real property tax as of 1985.

·         MERALCO appealed Tax Declaration No. 019-6500 before the LBAA[1] of Lucena City. MERALCO claimed that its capital investment consisted only of its substation facilities, the true and correct value of which was only P9,454,400.00; and that MERALCO was exempted from payment of real property tax on said substation facilities.

·         The LBAA rendered a Decision in LBAA-89-2 on July 5, 1989, finding that under its franchise, MERALCO was required to pay the City Government of Lucena a tax equal to 5% of its gross earnings, and "[s]aid tax shall be due and payable quarterly and shall be in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind, nature, or description levied, established, or collected x x x, on its poles, wires, insulators, transformers and structures, installations, conductors, and accessories, x x x, from which taxes the grantee (MERALCO) is hereby expressly exempted.

·         The City Assessor of Lucena filed an appeal with the CBAA[2]. CBAA affirmed the assailed LBAA judgment. Apparently, the City Assessor of Lucena no longer appealed said CBAA Decision and it became final and executory.

·         Six years later, on October 29, 1997, MERALCO received a letter19 dated October 16, 1997 from the City Treasurer of Lucena, which stated that the company was being assessed real property tax delinquency on its machineries beginning 1990, in the total amount of P17,925,117.34

·         MERALCO appealed Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394 before the LBAA of Lucena City on December 23, 1997 and posted a surety bond dated December 10, 1997 to guarantee payment of its real property tax delinquency.

·         LBAA declared that Sections 234 and 534(f) of the Local Government Code repealed the provisions in the franchise of MERALCO and Presidential Decree No. 551 pertaining to the exemption of MERALCO from payment of real property tax on its poles, wires, insulators, transformers, and meters

·         MERALCO went before the CBAA on appeal, which was docketed as CBAA Case No. L-20-98. The CBAA, in its Decision dated May 3, 2001, agreed with the LBAA that MERALCO could no longer claim exemption from real property tax on its machineries with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991

·         The Court of Appeals further ruled that there was no more basis for the real property tax exemption of MERALCO under the Local Government Code and that the withdrawal of said exemption did not violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

·         Lucena: MERALCO was obliged to pay the real property tax due, instead of posting a surety bond, while its appeal was pending, because Section 231 of the Local Government Code provides that the appeal of an assessment shall not suspend the collection of the real property taxes

Issue: W/ON Surety Bond instead of paying with cash is sufficient to enough to comply with Sec 252 of the LGC?

 

Held: Yes. By posting a surety bond before filing its appeal of the assessment with the LBAA, MERALCO substantially complied
with the requirement of payment under protest in Section 252 of the Local Government Code.

Section 252 of the Local Government Code mandates that "[n]o protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays the tax." It is settled that the requirement of "payment under protest" is a condition sine qua non before an appeal may be entertained

Clearly, under the Local Government Code, even when the assessment of the real property is appealed, the real property tax due on the basis thereof should be paid to and/or collected by the local government unit concerned.

In the case at bar, the City Treasurer of Lucena, in his letter dated October 16, 1997, sought to collect from MERALCO the amount of P17,925,l 17.34 as real property taxes on its machineries, plus penalties, for the period of 1990 to 1997, based on Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394 issued by the City Assessor of Lucena. MERALCO appealed Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394 with the LBAA, but instead of paying the real property taxes and penalties due, it posted a surety bond in the amount of PI 7,925,117.34.

By posting the surety bond, MERALCO may be considered to have substantially complied with Section 252 of the Local Government Code for the said bond already guarantees the payment to the Office of the City Treasurer of Lucena of the total amount of real property taxes and penalties due on Tax Declaration Nos. 019-6500 and 019-7394. This is not the first time that the Court allowed a surety bond as an alternative to cash payment of the real property tax before protest/appeal as required by Section 252 of the Local Government Code. In Camp John Hay Development Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals the Court affirmed the ruling of the CBAA and the Court of Tax Appeals en bane applying the "payment under protest" requirement in Section 252 of the Local Government Code and remanding the case to the LBAA for "further proceedings subject to a full and up-to-date payment, either in cash or surety, of realty tax on the subject properties

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[1] Local Board of Assessment Appeals

[2] Central Board of Assessment Appeals

Palaganas vs. People – GR 165483, September 12, 2006

 

Facts:

On 21 April 1998, petitioner and his older brother were charged under four separate Informations for two counts of Frustrated Murder, one count of Murder, and one count for Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 relative to Article 22, Section 261, of the Omnibus Election Code. The trial rendered a decision convicting the petitioner guilty for the crime of HOMICIDE (Not Murder) with the use of an unlicensed firearm.

Issue: W/N the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is a special aggravating circumstance

Held:

Yes. The use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance. Special aggravating circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case is merely an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, it cannot offset the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm.

Case Digest: Disini vs. DILG – GR 203335, February 18, 2014 (Libel)

 Facts:

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him to write his opinions in social media and such other similar means. petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.

Issue: W/N Section 4(c)(4) on Libel is constitutional

Held:

Yes.The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs Salvador Tulagan

 

Facts:

Salvador Tulagan, in two separate occasions, did willfully, and unlawfully, assaulted and had forcefully had intercourse with a minor. Both occasions were in the same year. Salvador denied the allegations claiming that he was out gathering banana leaves during the incident and that the grandmother of the victim was spreading false rumours as she had squabble with his mother. The RTC ruled that statutory rape was established. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not that the testimony of the victim was fraught with inconsistencies and lapses which affected her credibility.

 

Held:

No. Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.

Baccay vs Baccay G.R. No. 173138 December 1, 2010

Facts:

Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive. Noel’s family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noels invitations and whenever she attended those occasions with Noels family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to change, but she never did.

Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.

Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the familys coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.

Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noels mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam at her.

On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila.

RTC: Found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her husband without any provocation. 

CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: W/ON the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Held: No.  The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals. that the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.  The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.

Transpo Notes Aquino x Hernando Chapter 4

Transpo Notes Aquino x Hernando Chapter 3